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Introduction
R
ecent scholarship and declassified documents 
have thrown open further debates about NATO 
enlargement at a time when the unity and 
strength of the alliance is under scrutiny. As the 
primary offshore balancers in Europe, Britain 
and the United States show retrenchment tendencies, and the 
European Union seeks an independent military force projection 
capability, and arguably, strategic autonomy bordering upon 
future hegemonic aspirations.
Mary Elise Sarotte, a renowned post-Cold War authority, 
currently the Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at 
the Henry S. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins 
University, questions conventional wisdom about the benevolent 
intention of the American and West German strategists in the early 
post-cold war days.1 The West German motivation, especially, 
was not predicated upon integrating former Warsaw pact countries 
and spreading “liberal democracy,” or institutions, but to push the 
frontiers further east, at the cost of Moscow’s sphere of influence. 
Joshua Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations 
at the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, argues 
that American policymakers repeatedly assured the desperate 
Soviet leadership that the alliance would not move east, even 
though most of the pledges were informal in nature, and arguably, 
were debatable when one of the original parties, the Soviet Union, 
collapsed.2 It is appropriate to suggest that whatever may be the 
reason, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were under 
the impression that there would not be any actual movement of 
hardware and infrastructure towards the east.3
But what about Moscow’s threat perceptions? That is an 
immensely policy-relevant question, but one which has been 
hardly explored. The conventional wisdom suggests that NATO 
enlargement led to a revanchist Russia. This article summarizes 
the Western debate and push for enlargement, and then divides and 
explores three phases of Russian reactions to NATO enlargement, 
in light of the realist Harvard Professor of International Affairs 






































NATO Headquarters, Brussels, with the flags of all the member nations displayed.
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emanating from Moscow, as well as Western media, and studying 
actual observable reactions of Moscow vis-à-vis phases of NATO 
expansion, this article will suggest that Moscow is purely focused 
upon material and military aspects. It further suggests that the 
evidence of Moscow’s reflexive revanchism is sparse. Russian for-
eign policy is tested and correlated with Russian rhetoric, military 
strategy and Russian balancing actions, in light of each phase of 
actual and potential NATO expansion. The article will conclude 
that Russia balances against perceived threats, 
only in areas where it has entrenched material 
and military interests. Otherwise, Russia is 
aware of her relative military inferiority, and 
is agnostic about NATO and EU enlargement. 
Reality is, therefore, perhaps more complex. 
The enlargement itself was not the cause of 
Russian revanchism, and there was no uni-
form reaction from Russia about “Western 
betrayal.” Moscow was quite agnostic about 
NATO enlargement in parts of central Europe 
and former Warsaw pact countries. Moscow, 
however, did display aggression when Russia’s 
direct strategic interests were perceived to be 
threatened, such as Russian military supply chains in Eastern 
Ukraine, a naval port in Crimea, and defensible terrain and 
established bases in Georgia. 
These findings have enormous policy relevance as both 
NATO and EU plans further enlargement, American and British 
isolationism grows, and the European security scenario alters 
rapidly. The policy relevance of understanding Moscow’s strategic 
motivations is manifold, and helps guide British and American 
grand strategy in the changing security dynamics of Europe. The 
choice of pushing Moscow out of European balance is a political 
choice for London and Washington. Alternatively, a détente can be 
reached if London and Washington are willing to accept a small 
Russian sphere of influence. But there is no evidence that every 
single instance of NATO enlargement will be met with Russian 
military aggression or balancing maneuvers.
This article is, accordingly divided into 
four sections, followed by a policy-relevant 
conclusion.
The Western Debate About the Push 
for Enlargement
Assurances from Western leaders regard-ing NATO enlargement began on 
31 January 1990, with West German Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher making 
clear that the changes in Eastern Europe and 
the German unification process must not 
lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’5  Ruling 
out NATO ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, 
i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’ NATO Secretary-
General Manfred Wörner stated that the alliance is not looking 
to any shift of balance, or to extending military borders to the 
east.6 This pledge was repeated subsequently by Helmut Kohl, 
Margaret Thatcher, James Baker, Douglas Hurd, Francois 





































Tanks on parade in Moscow’s Red Square, 7 May 2021, in celebration of the 76th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany in 1945.
“But there is no 
evidence that every 
single instance of NATO 
enlargement will be met 
with Russian military 
aggression or balancing 
maneuvers.”




















to Gorbachev at NATO’s London summit in 1990: “We must 
find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its secu-
rity would be assured. …CSCE could be an umbrella for 
all this, as well as being the forum 
which brought the Soviet Union fully 
into a discussion about the future 
of Europe,” a pledge repeated by 
President Bush, and subsequently my 
British PM John Major, who person-
ally assured Gorbachev, as late as 
in March 1991, saying: “We are not 
talking about the strengthening of 
NATO.” Subsequently, when asked 
by Soviet Defence Minister Marshal 
Dmitri Yazov about East European 
leaders’ interest in NATO member-
ship, he repeated, “Nothing of the 
sort will happen.” 7
From the Western side, the first 
hint of NATO enlargement came 
with Secretary-General Manfred 
Wörner’s declaration in March 1992, 
that NATO’s doors are open. NATO’s 
enlargement policy was not a con-
certed effort initially, but organically 
developed throughout the early-1990s, 
and it gained momentum under the 
Presidency of Bill Clinton, whose administration tied it to the 
changing grand strategy of the United States. It was also a matter 































































(From left), President George H.W. Bush, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Manfred Wörner, 
Secretary General of NATO, in the Rose Garden of the White House, October 1990.
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of the expansion claim. While the Central and Eastern European 
states were wary of Russia and wanted to be under the security 
umbrella of NATO, they were rebuffed initially, for fear of Russian 
reaction.8  In April 1993, Clinton met Lech Walesa of Poland, 
Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, and Arpad Goncz of Hungary, 
who collectively argued that NATO should expand. Clinton’s 
foreign policy was predicated upon the idea that peace is pro-
moted with trade and free market, and democracies rarely go to 
war with each other, 
which was other-
wise known as the 
democratic peace 
theory.9  NATO 
expansion and the 
spread of liberal 
institutions was, 
therefore, a means 
to this policy.






for  expansion 
were that it would 
help communist 
states transition 
to democracy, and 
enhance continent-
wide security, and 
prevent a security 
vacuum in large 
swathes of territory, as 
well as preventing the 
rise of  ethno-nationalist 
harmful elements.11 While 
superficially sympathetic 
to Russia,  NATO 
expansion was primarily 
a security endeavour, and 
NATO was unwilling to 
let Russia have any say 
regarding the process.12
Further push for 
NATO expansion came 
from Germany, specifi-
cally from German Defence 
Minister Volker Rühe. He 
said that German stabil-
ity would be threatened if 
its new eastern frontiers 
are not further moved 
east.13 In the United States, 
National Security Council 
speechwriter Jeremy 
Rosner, leading the NATO 
Enlargement Ratification 
Office alongside Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, lobbied 
for Senate Approval for NATO’s geographic expansion, and coined 
the term “enlargement” as opposed to a more aggressive sound-
ing “expansion”.14 The idea was, however, territorial expansion 
and forceful spread of institutions and American support for 




























Czech President Vaclav Havel delivers a speech during the NATO summit in Washington, 23 April 1999, as US 




































US President Bill Clinton visits Russia, 10 May 1995.




















The opposition to this Clintonian NATO expansion came from 
strategic circles. The Pentagon was initially opposed to NATO 
expansion, and supported the Partnership for Peace (PfP), to allay 
Russian fears that would arise. Strobe Talbott, then-adviser to 
the Secretary of State cautioned, saying: “The key principle, as 
I see it, is this … An expanded NATO that excludes Russia will 
not serve to contain Russia’s retrograde, expansionist impulses; 
quite the contrary, it will further provoke them.”16 The idea that 
Russia would inevitably be provoked by territorial expansion was 
also furthered in academic arguments.17 Nevertheless, the Clinton 
administration was ideologically committed to expanding NATO 
and democratic peace.18 In January 1994, Clinton stated in a speech 
in Prague: “The question is no longer whether NATO will take on 
new members, but when and how.”19 It was followed by Clinton’s 
speech in Poland, calling the PfP, ‘…a first step toward expansion 
of NATO.’ By 1995, the process was inevitable. 
Russian Reaction to the First Phase  
of NATO Enlargement
The North Atlantic Council announced a summit in Madrid in July 1997, which decided to set the course for the Alliance 
to move towards the 21st Century, consolidating Euro Atlantic 
security.20  On 10 December 1996, NATO invited Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic to apply for membership at the 
Madrid summit. The first phase of the enlargement process was 
expected to take two years to complete, and by 1999, NATO was 
ready for new members. Because of its size and its geostrategic 
location, Central Europe was invaluable for NATO.21
Russian reaction to NATO expansion is difficult to chart as 
those reactions are also in phases. Initially, neither Gorbachev nor 
Yeltsin felt threatened by the NATO alliance, as firstly, both these 
leaders were under the impression that NATO 
is not expanding territorially, and both wanted 
to work with NATO, under the impression that 
NATO could provide some strategic stability in 
Europe, and secondly, both were under no illu-
sion that the former Warsaw pact countries were 
no longer under Moscow’s direct command. The 
common consensus in foreign policy circles 
and elites is that NATO enlargement results in 
the diminishing security buffer between Russia 
and West, and makes the defence of conclaves 
and strategic chokepoint like Kaliningrad diffi-
cult. Russian Defence Minister Grachev did not 
see a NATO expansion in the horizon, and the 
Russian military doctrine in 1993 was designed 
to foster an era of “partnership and cooperation,” even though it 
did mention that territorial expansion is a military threat, in future, 
should it ever happen.22 Since 1994, Atlanticists and liberals in the 
Western sense, have not acted as a unified political force within 
Russia.23 The Russian ruling elite, as well as opposition, whether 
communist or ultra-nationalist, were consistently skeptical of 
NATO enlargement, as were the Russian military elite. Russia’s 
Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1993 also referred to NATO as the 
“biggest military grouping in the world that possesses enormous 
offensive potential.”24 As late as 1994, there was no inclination in 
Russia that NATO was going to expand. At the end of 1993, First 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev confirmed to Russian 
lawmakers that ‘The greatest achievement of Russian foreign 
policy in 1993 was to prevent NATO’s expansion eastward to our 
borders.’25 There was a surprise in Moscow, with the launch of the 
NATO enlargement study in 1995, prompting Yeltsin to declare that 
the Cold war had been replaced with Cold Peace. The democrats in 
Russia felt betrayed and disappointed. Public opinion also started 
to turn against NATO.26
Even though neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin felt threatened 
by NATO, they both made it clear, that NATO expansion would 
be a constant source of animosity with the West. Ambassador 
Vitaly Churkin’s comments in Belgium also mentioned the threat 
to Russian interests would be NATO’s material and infrastructure 
in the former Soviet sphere. Even before there were any official 
statements from the United States about NATO expansion to 
the east, it was officially regarded by Russia as a threat to its 
national interests, a sentiment that was openly conveyed to the 
West. Yevgeny Primakov, at that time the director of the Foreign 
Intelligence, said in November 1993 that material and territorial 
expansion of NATO is dangerous for Russian interests, as Russia 
will be compelled to redeploy troops to the West.27
The Russian military and political elite acknowledged 
Moscow’s material and territorial inferiority compared to the 
Western alliance. The addition of central European states only 
increased that gap in aggregate power. However, two conditions 
from NATO’s side helped in allaying Russian fears. Russia partici-
pated in the Partnership for Peace in exchange for special status 
within North Atlantic Council. The partnership for peace program 
meant that there was a visible reduction of force posturing from 
the Western side. NATO’s new security doctrine resulted in a sub-
stantial reduction of conventional as well as nuclear forces.28 The 
forward presence of the United States was reduced from 325,000 
to 100,000 troops, and European members cut their troops by 
more than 500,000. As Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
were invited into NATO, the land sea and 
air units were reduced by 30-40 percent, and 
35 percent at readiness level compared to 1990 
statistics. Theatre level nuclear weapons were 
reduced by 80 percent. These reductions were 
clearly visible and denoted the lack of offen-
sive power or offensive intention on NATO’s 
part.29 Therefore, despite the rhetoric, there 
were conciliatory efforts from both sides.
The Russian foreign ministry condition was 
that Moscow would agree to NATO enlarge-
ment in Central Europe, as long as there are “no 
deployments of nuclear weapons or allied combat 
forces on the territory of the new member states,” 
both conditions agreed by NATO.30 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov also considered PfP to be damage limitation.31 NATO’s 
acceptance of Russian conditions happened around the same time 
when Russia was also invited to join Implementation Force (IFOR) 
in Bosnia, and to endorse the Dayton accords.32 The “NATO Russia 
Founding Act,” which was signed by both parties in May 1997, led 
to the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which allowed 
Russia to establish a mission at NATO. Yeltsin, in return, officially 
accepted the first round of NATO enlargement, to Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary as inevitable, while making it clear that Russia 
has strong opposition to NATO expansion to the Baltic countries, 
or the former borders of the Soviet Union. This new ‘red line’ was 
repeated throughout the remaining years of Yeltsin’s presidency.33
“Even though neither 
Gorbachev nor Yeltsin 
felt threatened by NATO, 
they both made it clear 
that NATO expansion 
would be a constant 
source of animosity 
with the West.” 
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In sum, there were visible Russian posturing and rhetoric 
that increased with NATO’s eastward enlargement. But it could 
be argued that Russian reaction remained limited, due to a clear 
reduction of NATO’s offensive capabilities, as well as perceived 
lack of clear offensive intention.
Russian Reaction to the Second Phase  
of NATO Enlargement
The second phase of NATO enlargement started with the invitation of more central European members, as well the 
Baltic states which formed the Soviet Union, to their member-
ship in 2004, one year after the Iraq invasion. The period also 
saw Russian strategic calculus change after the Kosovo war, as 
well as a change in Russian leadership. Even though Russian 
military doctrines started to reflect the changing dynamics, 
Russian leadership showed flexibility in aligning with NATO 
after Kosovo and after the 11 September terror attack.
Tensions between Russia and NATO escalated again 
during the conflict in Yugoslavia, and Russia warned in the first 
PJC meeting to caution against the unilateral use of force with-
out authorization from the United Nations. NATO ignored the 
warning, and the centrepiece of NATO’s new relationship with 
Russia, the Permanent Joint Council, broke down during the war 
in Kosovo.34 The war in Kosovo highlighted that NATO was not 
serious about Russian ‘consultation,’ nor was NATO unaware of 
Russia’s diminished military clout.35 Around the same time, another 
significant change happened as NATO started to discuss the pos-
sibility of moving one of its headquarters in Rendsburg, Germany 
to northern Poland – a stated redline for Russia and something 
NATO explicitly promised not to do earlier. The Russian Defense 
Minister in 1998 warned that such a territorial move would lead 
to a military confrontation. There was no military confrontation 
during the move, but Russia suspended ties with NATO and with-
drew its representatives from NATO headquarters in March 1999. 
Russia did return to the NATO table for talks eventually within 
a few months, but with a clear interest that Russian troops are 
part of peacekeeping in the Balkans.36 By the end of 1999, Boris 
Yeltsin resigned and Vladimir Putin was President.
The Kosovo campaign triggered the debate within the Russian 
military and strategic planning community with respect to NATO’s 
hidden goals, and subsequently triggered Russian military doc-
trines to be adjusted reflecting its defence policies.37 The first 
time since the Cold War, Russian strategic planners had to deal 
with the scenario of NATO forces projecting power within a 
weakened Russian territory, in the name of human rights.38 Around 
the same time, right after NATO enlargement in Central Europe, 
the Russian military updated Russia’s military doctrine, which 
focused upon Russian economic inferiority, the gap in military 



























Russian servicemen atop an APC, patrol the streets of the Chechen capital, Grozny, 1 August 2001.




















makes it abundantly clear as to which organization the document 
refers. Russia had abandoned its ‘no first use’ policy of nuclear 
weapons against an overwhelming conventional attack from a 
great power or alliance in 1993. That was continued in this new 
document.39 NATO, on the other hand, maintained no change in 
its nuclear posture, reiterating no plan and no reason to deploy 
nuclear weapons in new member states.40
Vladimir Putin was initially less hostile to the idea of 
NATO itself, even when Russian strategic doctrines continued to 
consider NATO a threat. He accepted that NATO enlargement 
agreed under Yeltsin was a fait accompli, and at least publicly 
stated that he wanted to rebuild relations with 
NATO. In his meeting with NATO Secretary-
General George Robertson, Putin stated that 
there is a need to resume Russia-NATO con-
tacts and compare the military doctrines and 
strategic concepts of Russia and NATO.41 Putin 
continued with the mixed messages, saying 
he is willing to theoretically consider the 
possibility of being a member of NATO in 
future in a BBC interview. Further, while 
attending a meeting with NATO in February 
2001, he mentioned that Russia was willing 
to coordinate with the US to form a European 
wide missile defence system instead of a NATO 
missile defence in Europe, and was willing to send Russian experts 
to Brussels to discuss the possibility, explain Russian and American 
cooperation on technology and to test public interest.42 For the 
first time since the Kosovo crisis, Russia announced a full meeting 
with NATO, even when NATO was reticent about commenting 
upon Russian membership. 
The 11 September attack on the United States changed the 
strategic dynamics of Europe. Russia was undergoing its own 
problems with the Chechen insurgency. Immediately after the 
attack, Putin said, ‘If NATO takes on a different shade and is 
becoming a political organization ... we would reconsider our 
position with regard to such expansion if we are to feel involved 
in such processes.’43 Within two weeks of the attacks, Russia 
declared that it would assist the United States in operating out of 
central Asian airbases, typically used and operated by the Russian 
air force and considered under Russian spheres of influence, as 
well as unilateral closure of an espionage centre in Lourdes, Cuba 
and a naval base in Vietnam. In December 2001, the United States 
unilaterally pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
which was simply called a mistake from the Russian side, but 
nothing else was done about it by the Russians. 
There were significant changes on the side of NATO as well. 
The 11 September attacks changed NATO’s own reasoning about 
enlargement from “democracy promotion” of the Clinton era to an 
alliance determined to pull efforts to tackle international terror. In 
the 2002 Prague summit, this new line was communicated by 
President George W. Bush, as he stated, “Expansion of NATO also 
brings many advantages to the alliance itself. Every new member 
contributes military capabilities that add to our common security. 
We see this already in Afghanistan—for forces from Romania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and others have joined with 
16 NATO allies to help defeat global terror.”44
This reframing of NATO resulted in further cooperation and 
made NATO enlargement more palatable to Russia for the time 
being. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov confirmed Russian under-
standing of NATO’s new position, and said, “Russia no longer 
considers NATO enlargement to be a menace because the alliance 
has undergone a radical transformation from a Cold War instru-
ment to defence against global terrorism and other 21st Century 
threats.”45 When NATO planned to invite seven new countries 
to join the Alliance at its Prague summit in the fall of 2002, 
the position was repeated by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, 
regarding NATO expansion in the Baltics. Ivanov stated: “Russia 
is not planning to get overly dramatic about the situation.”46 During 
the Rome declaration of May 2002, Russian 
understanding was that NATO and Russia will 
act jointly and equally as a side of twenty, 
instead of the previously agreed 19+1 formula, 
and would focus upon international terrorism 
and reaction to crises.47
As evident from the sequence of events, 
Russia was initially skeptical with respect 
to NATO enlargement in the second phase 
when for the first time, actual member states 
in the Baltic region which formed parts of 
the Soviet Union, were invited to be part of 
NATO. NATO hardware and outposts also 
moved east in a breach of a previously declared redline, and the 
Kosovo war was viewed in Russia as a direct attempt to claw away 
at the Russian sphere of influence. The Russian military elites also 
consistently saw NATO enlargement as a serious threat to Russian 
security and interests.48 Previously, in the 1990s, certain sections 
of the Russian military viewed NATO enlargement as German 
expansion and continuation of German grand strategy in East 
Europe.49 During the early-2000s, NATO enlargement started to 
be considered as an American plot to move inexorably eastward, 
and a continuation of American hegemony. While NATO was not 
part of the Iraq war, it did not have any discernible difference in 
Russian military thinking, as evident from the statement in 2003, 
after the Iraq invasion, by Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky, who 
stated that the world needs to be multipolar, otherwise it breeds 
instability.50 The Russian political leadership’s view of NATO 
showed greater flexibility. That could be attributed to a change in 
NATO’s reframing of its cause of existence, focused more upon 
counterinsurgency as well as fighting Islamic terrorism, just as 
Russia was facing a Chechen insurgency, Russian perception 
of NATO’s offensive intention underwent a change, which led 
to a temporary alignment of interests. The Rome declaration 
of 2002 further changed the relation between Russia and NATO 
as procedurally, Russian administration gained the framework 
of NATO-Russia Council, and perceived that NATO’s primary 
motivation shifted to counter-terrorism. While Russian military 
doctrine remains unchanged, the political speeches highlighted 
that Russia did not consider NATO a threat, but rather a partner 
against Islamic terrorism in a changing global security scenario. 
Russia did not perceive any offensive intention, and NATO’s 
declared offensive capability did not increase. Russia’s percep-
tion of a threat from NATO therefore remained neutral. NATO’s 
declared force posture with no new weaponry in the new member 
states, added to NATO’s focus on counterterrorism, led Russia to 
perceive a distinct positive change in a NATO – Russia future.
“Vladimir Putin was 
initially less hostile to 
the idea of NATO itself, 
even when Russian 
strategic doctrines 
continued to consider 
NATO a threat.”
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Russian Reaction to NATO Invitation to Ukraine 
and Georgia
The third and final phase of NATO enlargement is explored in this  section,  before relations with Russia broke down 
permanently, and Russia, for the first time since the Second 
World War, went to war with another sovereign state in Europe. 
After the second phase of NATO enlargement, in 2004, rela-
tions with Russia quickly broke down due to the animosity with 
the United States over the Iraq invasion at around the same 
time when the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ rocked Russia’s 
neighbourhood. This is also the time when the Russian military 
doctrines changed and Russian redlines on NATO’s further 
territorial enlargement continued. Russian political statements 
and military doctrines consequently reflected this change 
of perception.
When asked about further NATO expan-
sion plans regarding Ukraine and Georgia, 
Vladimir Putin said that Ukraine should 
exercise the plan independently but stated 
categorically that Russian position regarding 
territorial expansion remained unchanged, a 
hint at Yeltsin era red line.51 Russia maintained 
that the only way Russia would find further 
NATO expansion acceptable was if NATO 
transforms itself into a political organization, 
which, needless to mention, NATO had no 
intention of doing. NATO meanwhile was trans-
forming and enhancing its military capability 
as individual NATO members were preparing 
for a war in Iraq as part of the “coalition of 
the willing,” something which Russia opposed 
earnestly and joined forces with France and 
Germany to curtail. During the Iraq war, NATO supported Poland 
with communication and logistics, and on the request of Turkey, 
NATO took precautionary measures to install missile defences 
in Turkish territory, even when NATO was not taking part in the 
war as an organization.52 Russia continued to maintain that it had 
concerns regarding further NATO expansion, including territorial 
and infrastructure, and would change Russian military doctrines 
accordingly.53 Asked specifically about Ukraine again, Russia 
repeated that Ukraine is free to choose its future, within the EU, 
as long as it does not join NATO.54
As NATO continued with plans of another round of expansion, 
a territorial red line for Russia, NATO also began F-16 patrols over 
the Baltic Sea and Baltic territory, a significant new development 
in offensive capabilities, infuriating Russia. Putin immediately 
demanded that any new NATO member state accede and ratify 
the Conventional Forces Treaty to avoid any sort of a “strategic 
grey area.”55 By that time, there were massive transformations 
within Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which added on to 
Russian understanding that NATO is behind the crisis, and is try-
ing to encircle Russia and encroach even further. By this period, 
it was also clear that Russian intention (and Putin’s dream) of a 
“transformation” of NATO into a political institution instead of a 
primarily military one, with Russia being an equal member, was 
not going to be fulfilled anytime soon, and that was mainly because 
of NATO’s new members, who were disinclined to allow Russia 
any decision-making powers. NATO’s focus upon democracy 
promotion and nation-building in Iraq, corresponded with Western 
support of revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.
Finally in 2006, at Moscow University, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “we firmly raise questions about 
the transformation of NATO, the Alliance’s plans for enlargement, 
the reconfiguration of the U.S. military presence in Europe, the 
deployment of elements of the American missile defence system 
here, and NATO’s refusal to ratify the CFE Treaty. The future of 
our relations largely depends on what direction the transforma-
tion in NATO will proceed in after the Riga Summit, and the 
extent to which the security interests of Russia are going to be 
considered.”56 The rhetoric from Moscow was not just directed to 
NATO, but also at Ukraine and Georgia. Lavrov further warned 
that any move from Ukraine or Georgia towards NATO would mark 
a “colossal geopolitical shift” for Russia. The 
pitch continued to rise, with President Putin’s 
Munich speech in 2007, where he said: “I think 
it is obvious that NATO expansion does not 
have any relation with the modernization of 
the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in 
Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual 
trust.”57 That same month, the US planned 
to talk with Poland and the Czech Republic 
regarding the placement of missile defences, a 
significant permanent weapons system, which 
Russia considered a clear threat. At NATO’s 
Bucharest summit in 2008, Putin warned: “We 
view the appearance of a powerful military 
bloc on our borders ... as a direct threat to the 
security of our country.”58 Russian military 
generals started threatening war with Ukraine 
if NATO expanded eastward. In 2006, the Russian military journal 
stated that it would be shortsighted for Russia to ignore the fact 
that the NATO extension might be a central tenet of the United 
States striving to achieve unipolarity.59
In August 2008, after Russia’s war with Georgia, NATO’s 
foreign ministers declared that Russia’s military action had been 
disproportionate and that cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC) was suspended until further notice. Around the same 
time, NATO conducted an exercise in Georgia from 6 May until 
1 June 2009, which was perceived in Russia as a clear indica-
tion of NATO’s design on Russian borders. A 2009 essay from 
Military Thought stated, “As previously, the Americans will con-
tinue actively to foist their values on the rest of the world relying 
on all the force and assets available to them,” a charge repeated 
in 2010 after analysis of ongoing wars of choices by the United 
States.60 Another stated: “The armed conflicts of the late 20th 
and early 21st Centuries have been a graphic demonstration of 
the United States’ desire for a unipolar world and its determina-
tion to solve any problems by force, ignoring the opinion of the 
world community.”61 During the Arab Spring, the Russian military 
was certain that the instability and events in the Middle East 
were to promote American unipolarity.62 In most of these cases, 
NATO was considered to be an arm of either German or American 
grand strategy. 
“Russia maintained that 
the only way Russia 
would find further NATO 
expansion acceptable 
was if NATO transforms 
itself into a political 
organization, which, 
needless to mention, 
NATO had no intention 
of doing.” 




















Regardless of which, it was in all the cases, considered 
a threat to Russian security. At any rate, an enlargement plan 
with Ukraine and Georgia were the final territorial red lines and 
completely unacceptable at any rate, and that 
was made clear from the Russian side repeat-
edly. NATO continued to be ambivalent about it 
and offered Georgia and Ukraine Membership 
Action Plans, suggesting that membership 
in NATO was not a matter of whether, but 
when. In August, Russia and Georgia went 
to war over South Ossetia. Russia later stated 
that the war stopped NATO expansion.63 Ever 
since the 2008 war, Russia came out with new 
military doctrines stating NATO expansion as 
its biggest threat, and Defence Minister Sergei 
Shoigu identified NATO expansion as one of 
the top three threats to Russia.64 On 5 February 
2010, President Dmitry Medvedev approved 
the Russian Federation’s new updated Military 
Doctrine, which had been being drafted since 
2005, right after another phase of NATO expansion in 2004. This 
text supplemented the Russian National Security Strategy of 2009. 
The most serious threat was the attempt “…to attribute global 
functions to NATO in breach of international legal norms” and 
the NATO infrastructure moving closure to Russian territory. 
“The deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of foreign states 
(groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the 
Russian Federation and its allies and also in adjacent waters” 
and maintains that the way to solve the threat is a European 
security initiative and the changing of NATO 
into a political union.65 A more recent revi-
sion of the military doctrine was published 
on 26 December 2014, which reinforced the 
threats of NATO expansion as well as military 
infrastructure and large-scale military exer-
cises and deployment and buildup of military 
contingents of foreign states or alliances, in 
the territories of the neighboring states of 
Russia.66 Prompt Global Strike concept is 
mentioned as a military danger but within 
a context of interstate rivalries. Concerning 
NATO, “an abrupt exacerbation of the military-
political situation (interstate relations),” “a 
show of military force” through exercises in 
Russia’s neighborhood or “obstructing” state 
and military command and control, by means 
of a “global strike,” was considered a threat.67 Russian National 
Security Strategy, dated December 2015, also cites NATO troop 
deployments, and induction of former Soviet-allied states as the 
top threat to Russian security, adding that NATO missile defence 
plans are destabilizing, especially for Russia to protect its natural 



























Russian armoured personnel carriers on their way to the city of Gori during the Russo-Georgian War, August 2008.
“The most serious 
threat was the attempt 
‘…to attribute global 
functions to NATO in 
breach of international 
legal norms,’ and the 
NATO infrastructure 
moving closer to 
Russian territory.”



























Armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen, supply an APC in front of a Ukrainian marine base in the Crimean port city of Feodosia, 23 March 2014.
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